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SOVEREIGNTY, TRADE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT - A U.S.
PERSPECTIVE
Gary Horlick
The topic of trade, the environment, and sovereignty raises some of the
more passionate political debates going on within the United States and other
countries, particularly in dealing with the world trading system. We are in a
state of flux. This is a great time to be working in this field, since everything
seems to be a case of first impressions. The boundaries are being rearranged,
and a lot of the debates are white-hot.
As I prepared for this, I read a very apt summary of NAFTA by none
other than Henry King, who pointed out in his conclusion the rather startling
fact that, in Northeast Ohio, an area almost completely dependent on interna-
tional trade in many respects, the Congressional representatives were against
Fast Track. This scenario is repeated throughout the United States. Thirty of
the fifty-two members of the House Agriculture Committee said they were
against Fast Track. U.S. agriculture depends on exports; without exports it is
in red ink. So this disjunction between economic reality and politics shows
that Karl Marx indeed was wrong, but it also shows the current state of con-
fusion we are in about the swirling interplay of issues such as trade, the envi-
ronment, and sovereignty.
I am going to start with a deliberately simplistic way of looking at the
world of international law and the environment, fairly conventional and
somewhat over-generalized. You have environmental impacts within a coun-
try; local water pollution, for example. You have environmental impacts that
cross borders, Trail Smelter, being, of course, the classic case for U.S. and
Canadian lawyers. And you have environmental impacts in the global com-
mons. Classically, this meant the high seas, and now it includes, as we all
know, the atmosphere. One looks at the legal regimes, and to some extent the
trade issues affecting those three spheres, and you see all three of those
spheres being changed. You see legal rules that differ from the political
pressures, and you see the categories being rearranged, NAFTA being an
association of three sovereign countries.
* Gary Horlick is a Washington-based partner at the law firm of O'Melveny & Myers,
L.L.P., specializing in international trade in goods and services. He is a graduate of
Dartmouth College, Cambridge University, and Yale Law School.
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Let us start with the most classically, supposedly non-international envi-
ronmental impact - solely within the territory of a sovereign nation. I am
ducking all the arguments about what sovereignty is because we have heard
them all day today. But, certainly, you would think that something like local
water pollution would be, at least in international legal terms, of no concern
to anyone but the relevant government of the territory. This is no longer true.
We have two very hot issues, perhaps not under international law, but
certainly in the politics of trade negotiations which are changing that view.
The first, and it was very, very strong in NAFTA, is the view, whether le-
gitimate or not, that by maintaining low environmental standards, or by low-
ering its existing environmental standards, a country will "steal investment"
and steal jobs. This was certainly something that some U.S. environmental
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) played to the hilt during the
NAFTA debate. Environmental NGOs in the United States have had to learn
how to play hard ball in domestic political battles, notably the Clean Air Act2.•
of 1990. I would guess, to some extent, this concern for plant stealing and
lower environmental standards was a tactical choice to line up support for
labor unions. So, one can discount it as a tactic. One cannot discount the
force of the political appeal. So here you have, hypothetically, Mexico low-
ering its environmental standards, something that is presumably its own con-
cern under classic doctrines of international law, and being told, no, you can-
not do that. There is language, though hardly hard law or crystal clear hard
law language, in the investment chapter of NAFTA, that a Member should
endeavor not to lower its environmental standards to attract investment. This
is language that is repeated in at least some of the drafts of the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI), at the insistence of the United States.
So that is something that is no one's business except Mexico's, but Mex-
ico must agree to that under NAFTA, and now the United States is selling it
to the rest of the world. As I mentioned, there is considerable controversy
about whether this plant stealing actually happens much. But the political
reality is perhaps stronger than the underlying economic reality. That is one
side of the coin. You have groups, not even governments, but non-
governmental organizations, self-styled in one country, telling a sovereign
government what it can do with that sovereign government's environmental
regulations. I thought the NAFTA debate itself got rather carried away on
this, since, in effect, you had at least some NGOs saying that the United
States, Canada, and Mexico should all have harmonized environmental stan-
dards. But they were not willing to give the Mexicans and Canadians votes
2 Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1990).
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on what those harmonized environmental standards would be. There is also
something of a democracy deficit built into this debate as well.
The second aspect, the flip side, is represented by the recent WTO ap-
pellate body ruling in a case involving beef hormones. U.S. exporters were
trying to get the E.U. to comply with the result. But the nature of the debate,
and I will stylize the case to avoid getting too tendentious, was essentially
that the E.U. had no scientific evidence to support the ban on the use of cer-
tain natural hormones in beef.
So here you have a situation where a sovereign government, in this case
the E.U., (let us assume there is no scientific support) acted inconsistently
with the WTO. Prior to that, the E.U. argued that it could ban imports of beef
that had been raised with these growth-promoting hormones if it also banned
domestic production sales, which it did. It banned both. So, again, to stylize
it a bit, you have a ban on something solely because of local political pres-
sure for which there was no scientific evidence of danger. Yet, a WTO panel
ruled that, under the WTO, this was inconsistent. This is not some accident,
by the way. The sanitary and phytosanitary agreement within the WTO was
negotiated very much with this specific dispute in mind.
So, the fact that the E.U. lost this dispute was not exactly a surprise, since
the rules had been written to make sure it would lose. Indeed, you have since
seen the E.U. propose that consumer concerns be considered a legitimate
basis for regulation. Again, think about that in terms of a shift from what I
would call the "classical doctrine" that a government basically can do what-
ever it wants. It can do that as long as that government bans domestic pro-
duction as well as imports. We are now in this "brave new world," where the
sovereign government cannot even make that decision if it does not have
scientific support, as decided by an external supranational body. No wonder
people all across Canada and the United States are worried about anonymous
people in Geneva.
I would note that, while the E.U. spent ten years fighting off this im-
ported beef when there was no scientific evidence of any harm, they did miss
out on mad cow disease over the entire period. They also missed the point,
that one does not encourage local beef consumption by bad-mouthing any
beef, imported or domestic, without some scientific basis. You have never
seen an ad by Coca-Cola saying that Pepsi is bad for you. It destroys the
brand category. So within this first sphere, historically, the most sacrosanct
in terms of sovereignty, we already see erosion, both legally and politically.
No U.S. NGO believed that it was not allowed to push Mexico on Mexican
environmental practices that had no cross-border effects.
3 E.C. - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS48/AB/R
(Jan. 16, 1998). The author is council to the U.S. exporters.
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The next stage beyond that is what I would call "fairly indirect" cross-
border effects. In my view it is probably the most controversial, and it is also
one of the most emotional issues. A classic example is the current furor over
leg-hold traps, not a ban on the traps in Europe, but a ban on the traps in
Canada and the United States. Here you have an alleged cross-border effect,
which is that high-income consumers in western Europe feel injured by Inuits
in Northern Canada using leg-hold traps on animals. That is the cross-border
effect, a psychological one. I am stating that very neutrally. I am not telling
you it is good or bad. But it is a somewhat novel claim. In effect you have a
claim that these people in Europe can tell Inuits how to do something they
have been doing for years. This kind of environmental debate involving
charismatic animals has not been a very pretty one. Typically, the debate has
suffered from being played up in the press in a very one-sided way, and from
there it just goes downhill.
The tuna/dolphin dispute had a lot to do with that.4 If you actually read
the tuna/dolphin opinion in the WTO, which had a lot of the same character-
istics, you would see between the lines a very common characteristic of
GATT panel opinions, which is a suspicion that the importing country was
discriminating against foreigners. This was the case with the United States. If
you actually go through the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act,
5
you will find that it does favor U.S. fishermen. Surprise. In fact, you will find
many GATT panels where there is an underlying suspicion that a national
law-making body will favor its own producers. I am sure you are all shocked.
These are where the big controversies have been. We may be coming out of
that in a more rational way, not in a legal sense, but because of public rela-
tions matters. I do not know how many of you followed the fight in CITES
(Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species) last summer over
elephant hunting and sales of ivory. It was the first time where you actually
saw the public relations efforts more or less balanced. A group based in
Harae called "Camp Fire" actually got to the media and put forward the view
of the villagers, which was that they could make money having a controlled
hunt of elephants. Since they had no control of the elephants, their fields
were being trampled, and that had to be weighed against maintaining the
species.
I cannot tell you which way is right or wrong. What I can say is this; it
was the first time where the press reports were more or less balanced, and
that led to some sort of compromise. I am addressing that carefully as a po-
4 See United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594, 11 5.26-5.27,
5.31-5.32 (1991); United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839, In 5.26-
5.27, 5.38-5.39 (1994).
5 Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385 (1998).
[Vol. 24.177 1998
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litical relations matter. One did not see much argument about whether classic
principles of international law applied here. This was very much a question
of who could get the public sympathy. So that area has been, and I think will
continue to be, the most emotional. You can raise a lot of money if you are
on the right side of the issue. You can get a lot of votes. It gets a lot of public
sympathy. So, this indirect cross-border effect has probably already been the
nastiest issue in public terms, and it probably will continue to be so.
The more classic cross-border effects go back to Trail Smelter, and these
actually seem to be working out better within North America. One sees at
least increasing attempts at cooperative work recognizing that there are
cross-border effects. The last time I was in Toronto, someone reminded me
that half the air pollution in that city came from the United States. The• • 6
U.S.JCanada Agreement on Air Quality does show some attempt to work
things out in a practical way. There are some things being done between the
United States and Mexico in the same sense. One of the more interesting
things, given the OECD principle that the polluter pays, is that the rules are
not always followed. The best example is the Chernobyl cleanup. The E.U. is
funding a lot of that project. The victim pays because the victim wants it
cleaned up and wants to prevent it from happening again. The victim recog-
nizes that the polluter cannot pay. You do not have people standing on prin-
ciple there. You have someone figuring how to get the place cleaned up. I
think that the legal side of that has not really had many implications for trade.
It is odd because it is the most obvious cross-border effect. There have not
been many trade fights about it. People are not using trade sanctions to try to
force people into remedying cross-border pollution. It is unusual because that
is where you would expect the most fights.
The third general area is the global commons. This is probably the most
interesting because of the Kyoto Convention7 and the likely follow-up. My
personal view is that, politically, the global climate change movement will be
a juggernaut. It is going to run over a lot of people. Once again, there are
legal instruments for some of the global commons, but not for all. If you go
through WTO opinions, you will see some that you might consider to be
wishful thinking by panels. The party, typically the United States, that took
unilateral action should have gone out and negotiated an international agree-
ment. Usually, they tried and could not do it.
The WTO appellate body has certainly shown an enthusiasm for acting
like an appellate body. They always change something, and they also criti-
cize the panel. That area is where the most serious confrontation is likely to
6 Agreement on Air Quality, Mar. 13, 1991, Can.-U.S., 30 LL.M. 676 (1991).
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M.
22(1998).
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occur. So far, despite much fussing about the relationship of the WTO to
multilateral environment agreements (MEAs), there actually has not been
any conflict. The most obvious example is the Montreal Protocol on chloro-
fluorocarbons (CFCs),8 although there are provisions which are pretty obvi-
ously inconsistent and trade sanctions are permitted against non-members of
the protocol, even though they are WTO members. That would violate the
WTO, but none of those allegedly aggrieved people have ever bothered to
challenge it.
That could change with the Kyoto Convention. That is why I think the
most important item on the agenda right now is the so-far stagnant process of
reaching some sort of accommodation between the WTO rules and the
MEAs. I will not go through the entire debate, which has bored to tears eve-
ryone on the WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment for the last three
years. There have been numerous proposals. Just to give you a very quick
summary, one school of thought is that the WTO should create a set of ex
ante standards, and any MEA that meets those standards is waived from the
WTO rules. A second option would be a more conventional one-by-one
waiver; as agreements come up, they should go through some sort of process
and be waived.
The WTO rules are not set up for this. Getting waivers is an extremely
difficult thing. Waivers, at least theoretically in the WTO, are supposed to be
temporary, not permanent, although past history would not suggest that to be
a firm rule. The Committee on Trade and Environment has been talking
about this literally for three years and has gotten nowhere. If Kyoto is to
work and become effective, then something will have to give there.
One x-factor for all us international lawyers is that, so far, the MEAs pre-
dated the signing of the WTO Agreement in 1994. Thus, you had consider-
able concern about the later-in-time rule from an MEA point of view. To the
extent that there is a final agreement in Kyoto, binding on everyone - and we
will get debates on that - it will be later in time. So the trade people can have
heartburn about the later-in-time rule, rather than the MEA people. Speaking
as an observer, I can only wish that both sides avoid heartburn by figuring
out a common set of rules.
8 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541.
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